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{"ops":[{"insert":"Consider a two-player game where the player A chooses \u201cup\u201d or \u201cdown\u201d and player B chooses\n\u201cleft\u201d or \u201cright\u201d Their payoffs are as follows: When player A chooses \u201cup\u201d and player B\nchooses \u201cleft\u201d they both get $3. When player A chooses \u201cup\u201d and player B chooses \u201cright\u201d\nthey get $2(for A) and $4(for B). When player A chooses \u201cdown\u201d and player B chooses\n\u201cleft\u201d they get $1(for A) and $6(for B). Finally, when player A chooses \u201cdown\u201d and player\nB chooses \u201cright\u201d they both get $5. The two players decide simultaneously.\n(a) Draw the strategic form game. Is there any dominant strategy? Justify your answer.\n(b) Is there a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Justify your answer.\n(c) Find the best response functions and the mixed strategies Nash Equilibrium if each\nplayer randomizes over his actions.\n(d) Show graphically the best response functions and the Nash Equilibria (in pure and in\nmixed strategies).\n\n"}]}
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